Preflight requests were introduced so that a browser could be sure it was dealing with a CORS-aware server before sending certain requests. Those requests were defined to be those that were both potentially dangerous (state-changing) and new (not possible before CORS due to the Same Origin Policy). Using preflight requests means that servers must opt-in (by responding properly to the preflight) to the new, potentially dangerous types of request that CORS makes possible.
That's the meaning of this part of the original specification: "To protect resources against cross-origin requests that could not originate from certain user agents before this specification existed a preflight request is made to ensure that the resource is aware of this specification."
Let's imagine that a browser user is logged into their banking site at A.com. When they navigate to the malicious B.com, that page includes some Javascript that tries to send a DELETE request to A.com/account. Since the user is logged into A.com, that request, if sent, would include cookies that identify the user.
Before CORS, the browser's Same Origin Policy would have blocked it from sending this request. But since the purpose of CORS is to make just this kind of cross-origin communication possible, that's no longer appropriate.
The browser could simply send the DELETE and let the server decide how to handle it. But what if A.com isn't aware of the CORS protocol? It might go ahead and execute the dangerous DELETE. It might have assumed that—due to the browser's Same Origin Policy—it could never receive such a request, and thus it might have never been hardened against such an attack.
To protect such non-CORS-aware servers, then, the protocol requires the browser to first send a preflight request. This new kind of request is something that only CORS-aware servers can respond to properly, allowing the browser to know whether or not it's safe to send the actual DELETE.
DELETE request from their own computer?Sure, but such a request won't include the user's cookies. The attack that this is designed to prevent relies on the fact that the browser will send cookies (in particular, authentication information for the user) for the other domain along with the request.
That sounds like Cross-Site Request Forgery, where a form on site B.com can be submitted to A.com with the user's cookies and do damage.
That's right. Another way of putting this is that preflight requests were created so as to not increase the CSRF attack surface for non-CORS-aware servers.
But POST is listed as a method that doesn't require preflights. That can change state and delete data just like a DELETE!
That's true! CORS does not protect your site from CSRF attacks. Then again, without CORS you are also not protected from CSRF attacks. The purpose of preflight requests is just to limit your CSRF exposure to what already existed in the pre-CORS world.
Are you sure about that? It's not uncommon for multiple servers to handle requests for a single domain. For example, it may be the case that requests to A.com/url1 are handled by one kind of server and requests to A.com/url2 are handled by a different kind of server. It's not generally the case that the server handling a single resource can make security guarantees about all resources on that domain.
Good idea! In fact, the header Access-Control-Policy-Path was proposed for just this purpose. Ultimately, though, it was left out of the specification, apparently because some servers incorrectly implemented the URI specification in such a way that requests to paths that seemed safe to the browser would not in fact be safe on the broken servers.
Was this a prudent decision that prioritized security over performance, allowing browsers to immediately implement the CORS specification without putting existing servers at risk? Or was it shortsighted to doom the internet to wasted bandwidth and doubled latency just to accommodate bugs in a particular server at a particular time?
Opinions differ.